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I. Introduction 
The global financial crisis has led to a severe recession in Europe culminating 
in sovereign debt problems for many eurozone governments. Greece was 
particularly hard hit because of fiscal mismanagement and unsustainably high 
levels of public debt, resulting in an extraordinary and unprecedented bailout 
by eurozone governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 
the creation of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism1 and the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EU sovereign debt crisis of 
2010-2011 demonstrates the inadequate macroeconomic crisis management 
                                                        
*  I would like to thank KARIN LOREZ, URS HOFER and MELANIE WYSS for their research 
assistance. In a previous commissioned report, entitled ‘Market Impact of an Orderly Sov-
ereign Debt Restructuring’ (Sept. 2010), the author proposed the mandatory use of collec-
tive action clauses (CACs) for EU sovereign bond contracts and a permanent sovereign li-
quidity mechanism. The CAC proposal was later adopted by the European Council in De-
cember 2010. 
1 To pay for the Greek bailout, the EU created the EFSM in 2008 to lend up to 60 billion 
euros to EU member states experiencing financial difficulties arising mainly from interna-
tional trade finance. The EU used the fund along with additional IMF financial support to 
help pay the 110 billion euro bailout for Greece in May 2010. The EFSM will not be ad-
dressed further in this chapter. 
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framework in the EU and the need to establish a more orderly sovereign debt 
restructuring process. 
Europe has not had a legal or formal institutional framework to resolve a 
sovereign debt default or restructuring. Indeed, the Greek crisis and the grow-
ing sovereign debt problems of other EU states raise important questions 
about whether EU policymakers should establish a formalized institutional 
process across the EU to promote a more orderly sovereign debt restructur-
ings. The chapter analyses a number of corollary questions about how such a 
process could work without undermining market discipline, and what powers, 
if any, should be allocated to EU institutions to oversee sovereign debt re-
structurings and whether this complies with the EU treaties. It further exam-
ines what set of principles should guide policymakers in devising such an 
institutional framework and whether this could help indebted countries avoid 
a damaging loss of investor confidence and destabilizing market volatility. 
The themes addressed in this chapter relate to some of the important issues 
examined by Professor ROLF H. WEBER in his distinguished academic career 
in the areas of economic governance, financial regulation and financial law 
reform. Professor Weber’s analytical framework for analysing the institu-
tional structure of financial regulation and the development of financial law 
has inspired scholars from across disciplines, but especially academic law-
yers, in designing intellectual frameworks to analyse the role of law and regu-
lation in creating institutions of effective economic governance. 
This chapter was inspired by Professor Weber’s work in the field of Euro-
pean financial law and regulation. The chapter examines what type of orderly 
sovereign debt restructuring arrangements should be established in the EU 
and how it can address the type of liquidity and solvency problems which 
Member States have been experiencing in the recent sovereign debt and fi-
nancial crisis. In evaluating the first question, the chapter reviews the pro-
posal for a European Monetary Fund (EMF) and the operational structure of 
the EFSF. These approaches intend to remove the risk of disorderly default, 
which is the main risk that countries in a fiscal crisis pose to financial stabil-
ity in the euro-area. The establishment of the EFSF has brought some stability 
to European financial markets and has resulted in lower spreads on the sover-
eign debt of Greece, Ireland and other vulnerable euro-area states, but spreads 
remain high for these countries, which reflects inadequate market confidence 
in their fiscal sustainability and a concern that the EFSF is only a short-term 
measure designed to restore investor confidence in eurozone sovereign debt. 
The chapter argues that the EU should adopt a decentralized sovereign 
debt default and restructuring process that emphasizes the use of collective 
action clauses (CACs) to facilitate negotiations and restructuring creditor 
claims when a sovereign is experiencing financial difficulties. EU legislation 
should harmonize the principles and guidelines that govern the operation of 
CACs, but parties should be permitted some freedom to decide certain CAC 
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repayment terms and some of the parameters of the restructuring process. 
Also, EU institutions should create an EU sovereign debt agency that would 
oversee the application of EU principles and guidelines for Member State 
sovereign debt negotiations and contract formation and would provide market 
data on sovereign debt markets to market participants and sovereigns. The EU 
sovereign debt agency could also administer a European Financial Stability 
Fund that would be created to provide liquidity to states experiencing finan-
cial distress if the state in question fulfils the requisite conditions for obtain-
ing support. The Fund would be financed by a small transaction tax on all 
sovereign bond trading and derivative instruments. 
II. The Greek Crisis and the Sovereign Debt Problem 
1. The Greek Crisis 
The problems arising from the Greek sovereign debt crisis raise important 
issues regarding how the EU and the eurozone institutions should assist 
Member States which are experiencing liquidity and/or solvency problems. 
The EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) presently requires Member States 
not to run annual budget deficits in excess of 3% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and not to have national debt in excess of 60% of GDP. The Pact’s 
effectiveness has been undermined because of the failure of the EU Council 
to enforce its rules consistently across states and the inflexible application of 
its deficit and debt rules regardless of a state’s position in the economic cycle. 
Indeed, the Pact’s inflexible rules can be characterized as having resulted in 
neither growth nor stability. 
The EU lacks a fiscal policy dimension to assist states experiencing finan-
cial difficulties in crisis situations. Article 125 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits EU institutions from bailing out 
EU states experiencing fiscal problems.2 Article 122 TFEU, however, pro-
vides the legal basis for EU institutional and Member State support, as it calls 
for political and financial solidarity with Member States that are in severe 
difficulties. Paragraph 2 of Article 122 authorizes the Council to grant finan-
cial assistance from the Union to a Member State if the state in question is in, 
or seriously threatened with, severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or 
‘exceptional occurrences beyond its control’. Although a state facing serious 
budgetary constraints and financing problems would certainly not qualify for 
the natural disaster exception, it might qualify under the language of ‘excep-
tional occurrences beyond its control’ on the grounds that a self-inflicted 
budgetary limitation in combination with a global financial crisis that caused 
                                                        
2 Article 125 (1) TFEU excludes the allocation of liability to the Union and the Member 
States for the commitments of another Member State. 
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a substantial reduction in the country’s GDP is an exceptional occurrence 
beyond its control. 
Based on the Treaty provisions, the EU could adopt institutional reforms 
that provide state guarantees to Member States experiencing serious financial 
difficulties the causes of which are partly beyond their control. The misman-
agement of the Greek economy, exacerbated by the collapse of world trade 
and hence the collapse of shipping revenues, led to cumulative severe pres-
sures on the bond sales necessary to fund the Greek government deficit. Since 
Greek government bonds are denominated in euros, investors faced no cur-
rency risk. However, they did face increasing fears of default. The reaction in 
European capitals was to initiate a protracted, indecisive debate on raising the 
funds for a Greek ‘bailout’. As vague pronouncements were piled on indeci-
sion, the fear of default increased, so that when the EUR 120 billion bailout 
was at last agreed, it proved inadequate as a defence against the rising tide of 
default pessimism. The Greek crisis, along with the recent sovereign debt 
difficulties of a number of EU states, has defined the shape of necessary insti-
tutional and market reforms to be considered in this chapter. 
2. The Mexican ‘Tesobono’ Crisis 
The confused handling of the Greek crisis stands in stark contrast to the rapid 
and effective measures taken by the United States Government in the Mexi-
can debt crisis of December 1994, which was very similar in important re-
spects to the Greek crisis. The Mexican government had borrowed billions of 
dollars of short-term US dollar denominated debt when the economy was 
growing. When Mexico fell into a severe recession in 1994, it was forced to 
devalue the peso. This drove up the value of its sovereign bonds or ‘te-
sobonos’, as they were known. Investors in Mexican government tesobonos 
faced a complex mixture of currency risk and default risk. 
By late 1994, Mexican government finances were collapsing with USD 25 
billion coming due in a few months while central bank reserves had fallen to 
less than USD 6 billion. In devising a rescue plan, US policymakers and the 
IMF had not forgotten the Latin American debt crisis of 1982 in which the 
Mexican government had defaulted on USD 80 billion in loans from large – 
mainly US – banks, creating a contagion that spread rapidly across Latin 
American countries, causing them to seek emergency refinancing of their US 
dollar denominated loans from foreign banks. The US government intervened 
with guarantees for the loans only after defaults led to the near failure of sev-
eral large US banks: the US’s slow response in providing emergency liquidity 
support in the form of loan guarantees worsened the crisis and plunged Latin 
America into a severe recession that stunted its economic development for 
nearly a decade. 
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In contrast, during the 1994 Mexican crisis, the Clinton administration, 
acting with support from the IMF, assembled a USD 50 billion emergency 
package in a few days, predominantly in the form of guarantees, which 
stemmed the investor run and rapidly restored confidence.3 Although the 
1994 crisis was smaller than the Latin American crisis of the early 1980s, it 
could have threatened financial stability throughout Latin America and in 
other developing countries.4 Moreover, the growing integration of interna-
tional trade and financial markets suggests that the negative externalities of 
financial risk-taking can spread more quickly across borders and threaten 
global financial stability. 
In contrast, if a credible eurozone institution had guaranteed Greek bonds 
at the outset and had imposed adequate fiscal adjustments and facilitated 
restructuring of bondholder claims, the immediate crisis would probably have 
been over sooner, at much lower costs. Instead, the eurozone’s leading states, 
Germany and France – dithered and allowed the Greek crisis to worsen con-
siderably. It was not until an emergency meeting of EU finance ministers held 
on 9 May 2010 where they agreed to adopt an extraordinary rescue package 
guaranteeing all of Greece’s sovereign bonds and the bonds of other eurozone 
members by establishing an off-balance sheet entity which would issue bonds 
worth up to EUR 660 billion (including an IMF USD 250 billion facility) to 
banks and other investors which would be fully guaranteed by eurozone 
states. The emergency rescue package essentially bailed out the banks and 
other creditors who had purchased Greek sovereign debt and it imposed the 
burden of adjustment almost entirely on the taxpayers of Greece and indi-
rectly on the taxpayers of all eurozone states. The Greek rescue package will 
have the effect of increasing moral hazard for the creditors of EU sovereign 
states by incentivizing them to make more and riskier loans to eurozone states 
with the cost of any adjustment borne by the debtor state and indirectly by 
European taxpayers. 
The confusion and delay in putting together the guarantee fed the flames 
of volatility and it is now not clear that even this sum will be enough. A more 
damaging sequence of events would be difficult to imagine, but worse may 
come. Having at last chosen to follow a sensible guarantee strategy as dis-
cussed below, the eurozone governments have proposed to resuscitate a modi-
fied version of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The eurozone was and 
continues to be gripped by deficit hysteria, with all governments being forced 
                                                        
3 As ALAN GREENSPAN recounts in his autobiography: ‘Mexico ended up using only a frac-
tion of the credit. The minute confidence was restored, it paid the money back – the United 
States actually profited USD 500 million on the deal.’ GREENSPAN (2007). 
4 The North American Free Trade Agreement had liberalized much of cross-border finance 
and trade between Mexico and the US with the result that the two economies were increas-
ingly integrated and exposed to the economic and social problems which both experienced. 
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to commit to massive cuts in public expenditure. It appears that the path to 
recovery may be paved with higher unemployment and bankruptcy.5 
3. European Monetary Fund 
The absence of an EU sovereign debt restructuring framework and sovereign 
default mechanism has led to a proposal for a EMF which could provide fi-
nancial support to EU states which have already adopted the euro. The propo-
nents of the EMF, such as DANIEL GROS and THOMAS MAYER, argue that a 
sovereign default mechanism is necessary for the following reason: 
The strongest negotiating asset of a debtor is always that default cannot be 
contemplated because it would bring down the entire financial system. This is 
why it is crucial to create mechanisms to minimise the unavoidable disruption 
resulting from a default. Market discipline can only be established if default is 
possible because its costs can be contained.6 
The idea of the EMF is premised on the notion that sovereign defaults are 
good economic policy if a state has assumed unsustainable debt and that an 
orderly default can be permitted because its costs can be contained. This is an 
important assumption that drives the EMF proposal. The proposed EMF has 
been supported by the German Finance Minister and the IMF Managing Di-
rector.7 
The mechanics of the EMF would work as follows. The EMF will be fi-
nanced by euro-area states paying a 1% levy on the value of their annual defi-
cit exceeding 3% of GDP and on the value of their national debt exceeding 
60% of GDP. The levy creates additional incentives for states to comply with 
the SGP’s national debt limits by allowing the EMF to guarantee a Member 
State’s debt up to a value of 60% of GDP. It would have responsibility for 
organizing an orderly sovereign default as a matter of last resort.8 
The EMF will be allowed to borrow money on the capital markets. A 
Member State encountering financial difficulties would be allowed to submit 
a request for support but must submit a fiscal adjustment plan. If approved, 
the Member State can receive up to the amount of its contribution paid so far 
into the Fund. Proponents of the EMF assert that it can be implemented 
within the framework of enhanced cooperation, recognized by Article 20 of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and by Articles 236ff. of the TFEU. 
The enhanced cooperation framework requires that once Council affirms that 
                                                        
5 As the Financial Times leader argued on 25 May 2010: ‘growth is a precondition for stabil-
ity, not something to be traded off against it. Putting countries on the rack of debt deflation 
will not stabilise their economies, only destabilise their politics’. 
6 DANIEL GROS/THOMAS MAYER, ‘How to Deal with the Threat of Sovereign Default in EU: 
Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund’, Intereconomics – Forum 2 (2010): 64–68. 
7 DOMINIQUE STRAUSS-KAHN, IMF Managing Director, Lecture at King’s College, Cam-
bridge, Institute for the Teaching of Economics conference (10 Apr. 2010). 
8 GROS/MAYER (note 6). 
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the measure in question has a valid Treaty objective, it must decide whether 
the Union acting as a whole can achieve the objective within a reasonable 
amount of time. If it cannot, Council can authorize enhanced cooperation in 
this area by a group of at least nine Member States, thus enabling those states 
to move ahead with the legislation in question and to adopt it for themselves. 
However, other states must be allowed to participate in the enhanced coopera-
tion process if they comply with all the conditions laid down by the Council 
in its authorizing decision. 
The EMF proposal is an important development in the debate over 
whether to establish a centralized sovereign default support mechanism in the 
EU. Under the proposal, it would be operated by the eurozone states but is 
open to participation by all EU states if they satisfy the requisite conditions. 
Serious legal concerns have been raised about whether the EMF can be estab-
lished through the enhanced cooperation framework and whether it violates 
the no-bailout prohibition of Article 125 TFEU and whether it qualifies for 
the exceptions in Article 122 TFEU.9 It is submitted that in addition to the 
legal concerns, the adoption of the proposed EMF would represent a substan-
tial centralization of EU institutional authority to provide guarantees to ailing 
EU sovereign debtors without an adequate framework to encourage or facili-
tate negotiations between creditors and sovereigns over the restructuring of 
sovereign debt. Nevertheless, the EMF proposal is under serious considera-
tion by EU policymakers and will continue to play an important role in the 
debate over a reformed sovereign default mechanism in the EU. 
III. European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
The EFSF was approved by Council on 10 May 2010 to provide funding 
support to eurozone states which are in financial difficulties.10 Eurozone 
states (excluding Greece) pledged EUR 440 billion in 2010 to the fund that 
will be guaranteed by these fifteen states according to their respective contri-
butions to the capital of the European Central Bank.11 To enhance its credit-
worthiness, the fund has a cash reserve of 20% in addition to the amount 
pledged by each member. It was designed to be a short-term financing ar-
rangement that would be available to eurozone states experiencing financial 
difficulties only for three years, after which, the fund would be dissolved if no 
                                                        
9 ULRICH HÄDE, ‘Legal Evaluation of a European Monetary Fund’, Intereconomics – Forum 
2 (2010), 69–72.  
10 Council Regulation No. 9606/2010. See also Decision of the sixteen euro-area Member 
States (7 Jun. 2010) (Luxembourg). The EFSF has a basic securitization structure but with 
no tranches. Unlike other securitizations, there is no actual exchange of collateral. 
11 For example, Germany’s pro rata share of the fund is EUR 122.85 billion, while France’s 
share is EUR 92.3 billion and Italy has a EUR 81 billion share. 
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member had drawn on it.12 As discussed below, however, the EFSF has is-
sued bonds to pay for the Irish government’s EUR 67.5 billion bailout; these 
bonds are scheduled to be paid off over a 10 to 20 year period. This means 
that the EFSF will need to be established on a more permanent basis beyond 
2013. To ensure this, the Council of Ministers met in January 2011 and 
agreed that the EU Treaty (TFEU) would need to be amended to provide a 
permanent EU bailout fund and that the EFSF should be transformed into a 
permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The details of the ESM 
will be agreed in 2011 followed by the necessary proposed amendments to 
the TFEU to be submitted for ratification in late 2011 and 2012. In the mean-
time, the EFSF will remain active in issuing bonds to provide the agreed upon 
loans for Ireland and possibly for other eurozone states, such as Portugal, who 
may seek financial assistance.  
The EFSF relies for the most part on operational support from the German 
Debt Office and the European Investment Bank. It is an off-balance sheet 
special purpose vehicle that can issue bonds to the market and transfer the 
proceeds of the bond issuance to the eurozone states who have been approved 
for financial assistance.13 Before a euro-area member receives assistance, the 
Eurogroup must ask the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB to 
analyse the request and visit the country seeking assistance. Based on the 
Greek and Irish experiences, this may take about two weeks. The IMF and the 
EU institutions can then deliberate for another week or two before making the 
final decision to authorize the euro-area finance ministers to authorize the 
EFSF to raise money. At that point, the German Debt Office will work 
closely with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to issue the bonds as agent 
for the EFSF.14 
                                                        
12 The EFSF will close down in three years on 30 Jun. 2013, unless there is a financial opera-
tion in which a eurozone state draws on the fund, in which case the EFSF’s existence would 
be prolonged until the last obligation was fully repaid. 
13 It is not clear yet whether it will receive a Triple-A rating. The EFSF argues that the Triple-
A rating is justified based on the 20% reserve fund it will have in addition to the amounts 
contributed by each eurozone state.  
14 The EFSF can guarantee bonds up to EUR 440 billion but in actual fact this will be much 
less at an amount of about EUR 250 billion (not enough to cover loans to other countries) 
because the guarantees apply to 120% of the value of the bonds based on the 20% excess 
cash reserve designed to enhance the creditworthiness of the bonds for a Triple-A rating. 
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Much uncertainty surrounds the fund: little is known about whether inves-
tors will continue buying the bonds it issues if the fiscal positions of more 
eurozone states (who are guarantors) continue to deteriorate and they too 
apply for support from the fund, which is a strong possibility now for Portu-
gal, Spain, Italy and Belgium.15 The fund has attracted criticism as ‘an at-
tempt to resolve the crisis with imaginary money rather than providing real 
money and having to find it somewhere’.16 Moreover, if several countries 
seek assistance at once, there is a risk that the fund could be exhausted, but 
fund proponents argue that this is unlikely because foreign investors are re-
turning to the sovereign debt markets and China has even promised to buy the 
bonds of several ailing eurozone sovereigns.17 Euro-area states can also use 
the fund to bail out their banks. The recent sovereign debt problems of Ireland 
arising from it assuming substantial liabilities from its largest banking and 
financial institutions resulted in the EFSF’s first bailout. The Irish experience 
suggests that other eurozone states with unsustainable fiscal positions will 
probably have to tap the EFSF as well. 
The creation of the EFSF initially brought some stability to European fi-
nancial markets and restored some investor confidence in Greek sovereign 
                                                        
15 The EFSF is incorporated and domiciled under Luxembourg law and KLAUS REGLING was 
appointed as chief executive on 1 July 2010.  
16 LIZ CHONG, ‘Klaus Regling Explains the EU’s Stability Fund’, The Financial News, 8, 
(July 2010), quoting DAVID WATTS.  
17 See comments of EFSF CEO KLAUS REGLING Proponents citing the Chinese foreign ex-
change department’s announcement in July 2010 that it would buy more Spanish govern-
ment bonds. The Financial News, ‘Special Purpose Vehicle Set on Rescue Mission’, (July 
2010), 9. 
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debt and in the debt of other vulnerable eurozone sovereign debtors. Never-
theless, EU financial markets remain fragile in 2011: Ireland was forced to 
seek a bailout because of the huge pre-tax losses of its largest banks which 
increased the costs of the country’s credit default swaps (CDSs) by 40% since 
1 August 2010. Ireland’s fiscal position remains unsustainable and the prob-
ability is high that a restructuring Irish bondholder claims will be necessary 
with significant ‘haircuts’.18 The persistent troubles with Ireland’s state-
owned banks suggest that the newly created EFSF have not sufficiently eased 
investor concerns about EU financial institutions and by extension have re-
kindled fears about the solvency of some deeply indebted EU sovereigns, 
such as Greece, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy. These concerns have led 
financial institutions in these countries to increase significantly their borrow-
ing from the ECB in 2010 and early 2011. Moreover, as part of its emergency 
programme begun in May at the height of the Greek crisis to purchase euro-
zone sovereign bonds, the ECB continued to purchase substantial amounts of 
short-dated Irish bank bonds in an effort to reduce growing volatility in the 
Irish bond market based on investor concerns that the government will have 
to continue massive public support for Ireland’s weakened banking sector. 
These developments suggest that volatility is returning to EU sovereign debt 
markets and that investor concerns have not been allayed by the much-
heralded bank stress tests and the creation of the EFSF. 
IV.  Reforming Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the EU 
This chapter argues that a reformed institutional structure at the EU level to 
oversee sovereign debt restructurings and, in exceptional circumstances, sov-
ereign defaults should be established based on a coherent set of principles that 
are linked to a new decentralized EU institutional structure with clear lines of 
responsibility and decision-making to facilitate negotiations between creditors 
and sovereigns during periods of financial distress. The desirability of a level 
playing field in the EU internal market suggests that such an approach can be 
based on a harmonized set of principles and guidelines across EU states that 
govern the application and operation of this sovereign debt restructuring 
process. 
                                                        
18 Indeed, there is agreement among most economists, including IMF economists, that Greece 
will have to restructure most of its existing debt, which is forecast to exceed 150% of GDP 
in late 2011. Moreover, there is tremendous political pressure on the newly-elected Irish 
government to seek a reduction in the interest rate on their loan from the EFSF and to seek a 
restructuring of the payment terms to bondholders of Irish banks in order to force a ‘haircut’ 
on their claims. See Wall Street Journal (Europe), ‘A comprehensive guide to ending 
Europe’s crisis’ Charles Forrelle (25 Jan 2011), 4. 
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1. A Decentralized EU Institutional Approach 
The recent sovereign debt crisis and ongoing financial turbulence in global 
and European financial markets demonstrates the need for a more coherent 
and rational sovereign debt default and restructuring process. Such a process 
could reduce the uncertainty and thus the moral hazard for states to reach 
unsustainable debt levels by creating a more predictable sovereign debt re-
structuring process. A clearer procedural framework and set of principles 
applicable throughout Europe would lead to improved and more timely sov-
ereign debt management decisions, thus reducing the likelihood of crises 
occurring and mitigating the associated costs. The aim for creating a more 
orderly sovereign debt restructuring process in Europe would be to increase 
the incentives that sovereigns have to pay their debts in full and on time. This 
will allow sovereigns to have continued access to capital at reasonable inter-
est rates. To achieve this, a clearer EU legal and institutional framework 
should be established to reduce the uncertainty that now surrounds sovereign 
defaults and restructurings. 
Recent proposals as discussed above for a EMF or the creation of a new 
EU agency with powers to arbitrate and resolve sovereign debt disputes 
would probably require amending the EU Treaty, which may not be a feasible 
political proposition at present.19 Instead, this section suggests that EU poli-
cymakers should consider the following principles and rules to provide more 
certainty to sovereign debt risk management for both sovereigns and inves-
tors. These would not necessitate Treaty changes, but would be feasible 
within the existing legislative instruments. 
a) Collective Action Clauses (CACs) 
CACs – also known as majority action clauses – allow a super-majority of, 
for example, bondholders holding a particular class of bond contracts to vote 
to restructure the financial or repayment terms of the bond.20 The bond con-
tract could provide, for instance, that 75% of creditors – rather than 100% – 
of a certain creditor class vote to restructure the financial and repayment 
terms (i.e., lower the interest rate or extend the maturity of the debt, respec-
tively). The super-majority’s decision would bind the minority bondholders 
of the same class, thus preventing a small minority from delaying or other-
                                                        
19 See discussion in HÄDE (note 9). 
20 The financial terms of the contract would generally include the rate of interest (the coupon 
rate), the amount of the principal, and related financing terms, while the repayment terms 
would include the date of periodic payments and the means and place of payment, the loan’s 
maturity date, and in some cases what amount of interest and principal would be included in 
each payment.  
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wise disrupting a restructuring agreement, thereby making the restructuring 
process more predictable.21 
First, sovereign debtors and investors should agree henceforth to incorpo-
rate CACs into sovereign bond contracts or sovereign loan contracts (i.e., 
bank loans) governed under the law of an EU state. Although investors and 
sovereigns are increasingly using CACs in their sovereign bond contracts 
following the Argentine default, significant differences in the structure of 
these contracts still exist, thus increasing uncertainty regarding the renegotia-
tion of repayment terms and how the overall restructuring process would 
operate. Sovereign bond contracts issued by EU states should have harmo-
nized legal templates governing their overall structure but would allow the 
parties to agree on some of the specific repayment terms. 
Although a growing number of EU sovereign bond contracts contain 
CACs, the majority does not, which means that for most EU sovereign bond 
contracts the consent of 100% of the bondholders of a particular class of 
bonds are necessary to change the repayment terms of the bond.22 As a result, 
a small minority of bondholders can prevent a restructuring that the majority 
believe to be in their best interests. Rather, EU directives and regulations 
should require that all sovereign bond and loan contracts contain majority 
action clauses, but allowing the parties to agree on certain repayment terms, 
such as specifying the percentage of creditors holding a certain value of the 
debt (e.g., 85%, 75% or 65%) to approve a change in payment terms (e.g., 
lower interest rate). EU law should also require that sovereign bond or loan 
contracts contain a clause describing the process through which sovereign 
debtors and creditors negotiate if a restructuring event were to occur. This 
clause would specify how the creditors would be represented and by whom 
and on what date, or within what period of time, the debtor must provide 
financial and other information to the creditors' representative. The represen-
tative would be authorized to act on behalf of the creditors in the negotiations 
and have discretion to act based on the instructions of creditors with a speci-
fied percentage value of claims.23 
                                                        
21 CACs are in all sovereign bonds issued under English law and are increasingly being used 
under New York law sovereign bond contracts, which by tradition required unanimity or 
100% of creditors of the same class to vote to restructure the financial or repayment terms 
of the bond contract.  
22 See ELMAR B. KOCH (2003), Challenges at the Bank for International Settlements: An Eco-
nomist’s (Re)view (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), 56–60, stating ‘[t]radition-
ally, CACs were included in sovereign bonds governed by English, Japanese and Luxem-
bourgian law. Sovereign bonds issued under US, German, Italian and Swiss law did not in-
clude CACs’, and thus required unanimous approval by bondholders of a particular class of 
bonds to change repayment terms. Ibid., 60–65, providing data of the value of sovereign 
bond issuance with CACs.  
23 The specified percentage value of claims would be provided in the repayment terms of the 
contract. Moreover, the representative, and not individual creditors, would have the author-
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Another important area concerns how the sovereign would initiate a re-
structuring. EU law could require that this could be provided in a clause de-
scribing what period of time – e.g., four weeks – for creditors to come to-
gether to obtain the relevant information regarding the sovereign’s financial 
situation, choose a representative, and decide a timeline for the negotiation 
process. The notion of a ‘cooling off’ period or automatic stay on creditor 
action against non-sovereign corporate or individual debtors is already recog-
nized in the insolvency laws of some countries, such as Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code.24 The contract would be required to state when the ‘cool-
ing off’ period would begin, e.g., the date when the sovereign notifies its 
creditors that it wants to restructure its payments and/or the date that the 
creditors appoint their representative. The duration of the cooling off period 
would be mandated by EU law at, say, sixty or seventy-five days. During this 
period, a temporary suspension or deferral of payments would be required 
and enforced by an EU court of law. EU law should mandate that the bond or 
loan contract should provide for the possibility of a suspension or deferral of 
payments and provide for damages or penalties for any creditor who violates 
the provision by seeking to enforce its claim without prior court approval. 
b) Implementation 
The decentralized approach that relies on regulating EU sovereign bond and 
loan contracts so that they contain CACs is not the only option that has been 
proposed for reforming the sovereign debt restructuring process. Of course, 
the IMF staff had proposed an international sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism (SDRM) in 2002 that attracted much attention but was not ap-
proved because of US opposition. The SDRM would have provided a more 
centralized approach that would have involved amending the IMF Articles of 
Agreement in order to create a legally binding arbitration process in which a 
designated IMF tribunal would have mediated and approved any disputes 
regarding the restructuring of sovereign debt.25 The IMF’s SDRM was criti-
                                                                                                                              
ity to initiate litigation for breach of the bond or loan covenants, but only with the approval 
of creditors with a specified value of claims.  
24 Although Ch. 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code does not apply to sovereign debt default or re-
structuring, Ch. 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code does provide insolvency proceedings and an 
automatic stay against creditor claims against a municipal or county government debtor 
while the sovereign debtor is formulating a repayment plan for judicial and creditor ap-
proval. While the automatic stay is in effect, secured creditors can petition the court for 
adequate protection of their collateral rights in eligible property owned or possessed by the 
debtor. In Chs 9 and 11, the automatic stay can remain in effect for up to a six-month period 
to allow the debtor an opportunity to negotiate with creditors and devise a comprehensive 
payment plan.  
25 ANNE KRUEGER, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 16 Apr. 2002, Wash-
ington DC, International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdr 
m.pdf (‘SDRM – April version’, 11–14). 
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cized on the grounds that it was insufficiently market-oriented and required 
too much centralized authority at the international level by concentrating too 
much power in the IMF. These same criticisms are perhaps also applicable to 
recent proposals to create an EU Monetary Fund that would provide guaran-
tees on sovereign debt and liquidity assistance for ailing EU sovereign debt-
ors while negotiating creditor claims, or the creation of the EFSF, which also 
provides liquidity support and issues guarantees for eurozone sovereigns 
having financial difficulties. 
On the other hand, one can question the viability of the decentralized ap-
proach on the grounds that there are multiple legal systems of contract law in 
the EU and that this might be difficult to harmonize in order to facilitate sov-
ereign debt negotiations and restructurings. Another question concerns what 
is the scope of the debt subject to the CACs. In theory, there would be no 
reasonable justification on economic grounds to restrict the scope of such 
clauses to bond contracts. It is observed that such clauses are already incorpo-
rated in many syndicated bank loans.26 Another question concerns whether 
during a restructuring all the claims of different bond issues should be con-
solidated into a single class of creditors or, alternatively, whether all the 
claims of bondholders should be consolidated with the claims of other credi-
tors (i.e., bank loans). Market-based practitioners appear to prefer an ap-
proach that consolidates the CACs and other clauses into debt on an issue-by-
issue or loan-by-loan basis. Any inconsistency in legal terms or requirements 
created by different types of issues or jurisdictions should be resolved by 
arbitration provided in the contracts or by an EU agency established (as dis-
cussed below) to apply the EU principles and guidelines governing sovereign 
debt restructuring. 
Finally, the EU must have the institutional capacity to monitor the imple-
mentation of such debt contracts to ensure that vital data is communicated to 
creditors and debtors and that the parties negotiate terms and conditions with 
full access to relevant information. An EU sovereign debt agency could be 
created by Regulation to exercise such a function and would have authority to 
collect data and perform surveillance of sovereign debt markets and report 
market developments to the European Commission, Parliament and market 
participants. The responsibilities of a EU sovereign debt agency could include 
overseeing EU Member State sovereign debt practices and providing data to 
the market regarding the risks that certain bond and loan contracts pose and to 
                                                        
26 JOHN B. TAYLOR, ‘Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards’, conference address, 
Washington DC, Institute for International Economics, (on file with author)(observing that 
such clauses are included in bank loan agreements). See also, STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, ‘Sov-
ereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach’, Cornell Law Review 
85 (2000), 975, 982–984, and STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ‘Facing the Debt Challenge of Coun-
tries that are Too Big to Fail’, Duke Law Working Paper, 1–7 (2008). 
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make recommendations and, if necessary, ‘name and shame’ states which 
appear to be developing unsustainable debt positions. 
The agency could also exchange information with the ECB, the European 
Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board regarding 
financial stability issues in the sovereign debt markets. Moreover, it would 
clarify the process how market participants could enforce their rights and 
obligations under the debt contracts in a court of law of an EU state, espe-
cially to ensure that any restructuring process is occurring according to con-
tractual requirements. 
2. EU Financial Stability Fund 
The EU sovereign debt agency with responsibility for overseeing the imple-
mentation of the CAC approach to sovereign debt restructuring based on 
harmonized EU principles and guidelines could also administer the estab-
lishment of a EU ‘stability’ fund to which EU states experiencing short-term 
funding problems would have access for short-term funding during financial 
distress and crises until they regain access to capital markets. The EU ‘finan-
cial stability’ fund would be paid for by a small transaction tax on all sover-
eign bond sales.27 The tax could be imposed at a very low level – ten basis 
points/0.10%, or five basis points/0.05% – so as not to distort significantly the 
sovereign bond market and it would be easily implemented by requiring the 
intermediary banks who execute the transactions to deduct the tax at the point 
of purchase and sale and pay on to national treasuries who would then have 
an obligation to pay the sums into the fund. The tax could also apply to sov-
ereign debt derivative instruments (i.e., sovereign credit default swaps 
[CDSs]) or other instruments which use sovereign debt as a referenced asset. 
The tax would apply uniformly to all EU sovereign bond issuance and could 
even be extended to include a tax on bank loans to EU governments. The tax 
could provide a sustainable source of finance to assist EU sovereigns experi-
encing sovereign liquidity problems and help assist the implementation of any 
restructuring plans. In return for accessing the fund, states would be required 
to implement appropriate fiscal adjustments in order to bring their sovereign 
debt to sustainable levels over the medium term. 
If instead the country is not merely illiquid, but insolvent, more drastic 
measures should be taken and the EU stability fund would continue to be 
available, but needs to be supplemented by a mechanism for determining 
collective guarantees.28 These should be offered on the basis of strict condi-
tionality, in which the state in question may be required to undertake signifi-
                                                        
27 See KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., ‘Crisis Management, Burden Sharing and Solidarity Mecha-
nisms in the EU’, Brussels, European Parliament, May 2010, 43.  
28 This means that EU authorities should adopt criteria for determining whether a state is 
either illiquid or insolvent; or, if it is illiquid, at what point does it become insolvent? 
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cant structural reforms to, for example, the fiscal system, the structure of 
macroeconomic management, or the labour market. Short-term austerity 
measures may be a necessary component of a rescue package. But their im-
pact should always be assessed against the needs of medium-term recovery. 
This also means that the rules of the SGP that have so conspicuously failed 
should be reconsidered and possibly replaced. 
The approach suggested above would involve a major rethink of the po-
litical economy of the EU in general and the eurozone in particular. It would 
require a significant change of direction in fiscal policy, including a harmo-
nized EU framework consisting of principles and guidelines to govern the 
restructuring and default of a sovereign debtor. The absence of an EU regime 
governing the restructuring of sovereign debt has resulted in an under-pricing 
of the true costs of sovereign debt, as it creates a moral hazard for investors to 
take on too much sovereign debt because they perceive that euro-area states 
in particular will always bail them out to prevent a collapse of the eurozone. 
This has led to an under-pricing of sovereign debt which means that the full 
cost of sovereign debt has not been internalized by those who invest in it, 
thereby resulting in too much of it being issued. Moreover, investors would 
be able to price sovereign debt more efficiently if they had more certainty 
regarding the rules of debt renegotiation and the ability to coordinate their 
claims collectively with other creditors in a crisis and to obtain relevant in-
formation from sovereigns. Whether such an EU agency could be constructed 
to facilitate such negotiations and generate relevant information for creditors 
is a policy matter and legal issue that is beyond the scope of this brief study. 
3. EU Stability Mechanism 
The above proposal for EU collective action clauses and EU sovereign debt 
agency were made by the author in a report commissioned by the European 
Parliament in September 2010. Following this report in December 2010, the 
European Council, considering it necessary to establish a more permanent 
emergency financing mechanism for sovereign debtors, created in December 
2010 a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) based on the current EFSF 
capable of providing financial assistance programmes for eurozone member 
states under strict conditionality. Significantly, the ESM will enjoy preferred 
creditor status for its loans to sovereign debtors which means that the claims 
of private sector creditors, such as bondholders, will be subordinated to ESM 
loans. ESM loans will only be disbursed to a eurozone state if it appears in-
solvent and it has agreed to a debt sustainability plan with the Commission 
and the IMF which must involve both an economic and fiscal adjustment 
programme and a comprehensive restructuring of creditor claims. 
Under the proposal, the restructuring of creditor claims must involve the 
use of standardized and identical collective action clauses (CACs) to facilitate 
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the bailing in of the private creditors while maintaining market liquidity. The 
CAC requirement derived from a commissioned report submitted to the 
European Parliament in August 2010 that recommended the use of CACs for 
all EU states along with a EU sovereign debt financing facility (see enclosed 
proposals). Eurozone governments will be required to issue CACs starting in 
June 2013 when the ESM begins its operations. The CACs would be similar 
to the CACs already in use under English and US law that are modelled in 
part on a G10 Report in 2002 recommending the use of CACs with ‘aggrega-
tion clauses’ that allow all debt securities issued by a state to be considered 
and voted on together as part of restructuring negotiations with the sovereign. 
Crucially, bondholders would be allowed to pass by a qualified majority vote 
a legally binding change to the terms of payment, such as a standstill, matur-
ity extension, interest rate cut or reduction in principal, if the sovereign is 
unable to pay. This sweeping reform of the legal framework of sovereign debt 
finance and restructuring will take effect in June 2013 with the effectiveness 
of the framework being evaluated by the Commission and ECB in 2016. 
V. Conclusion 
ROLF H. WEBER’s long time work analyzing the contours of EU banking and 
financial regulation provide important insights for how policymakers and 
regulators should consider financial stability issues that arise from sovereign 
debt crises. Indeed, his analytical framework of systemic risk in financial 
markets provides an intellectual framework for how we might analyse the 
relevant regulatory and legal issues involved in building a more effective 
crisis management mechanism as well as building a more durable regulatory 
regime to control systemic risk. The design of sovereign bond contracts and 
the regulation of sovereign bonds to control systemic risk is an important 
extension of the intellectual framework developed by Professor Weber for the 
regulation and control of systemic risk in financial markets more generally. 
The EU Sovereign debt crisis of 2010 involving Greece and Ireland dem-
onstrates how financial distress in one member state can rapidly spread 
through contagion channels to threaten the macroeconomic and financial 
stability of both the eurozone and the European Union and even have interna-
tional ramifications. Although EU bank stress tests, reported in July 2010, 
calmed concerns about the health of EU banks by showing generally that EU 
banks were not inadequately capitalized nor dangerously exposed to sover-
eign debt, EU financial markets remain fragile. The renewed troubles with 
Irish banks and Ireland’s and Greece’s persistent sovereign debt problems 
suggest that the results of the stress tests have not sufficiently eased investor 
concerns about EU financial institutions and by extension have rekindled 
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fears about the solvency of some deeply indebted EU sovereigns, especially 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. 
These developments suggest that volatility is returning to EU sovereign 
debt markets and that EU policymakers should consider whether Europe 
needs a formal EU sovereign default process to incentivize states to manage 
more effectively their sovereign debt and to promote a more orderly resolu-
tion of creditors’ claims. This chapter examined a number of options, includ-
ing the newly created EFSF, and suggests that European policymakers should 
focus reform efforts on adopting a decentralized sovereign debt restructuring 
process that emphasizes the use of CACs to facilitate negotiations and infor-
mation flow between creditors and sovereigns regarding sovereign debt risks. 
EU directives and regulations, not necessitating Treaty changes, should har-
monize the principles and guidelines that govern the operation of CACs, but 
parties should be permitted some freedom to decide the parameters of CAC 
negotiations and some aspects of the restructuring process. 
An EU sovereign debt agency should be created to facilitate such negotia-
tions and to serve as an information warehouse for creditors and sovereigns to 
obtain data on market developments relevant to the pricing of sovereign debt 
risk. The EU sovereign debt agency could also administer a European Finan-
cial Stability Fund that would be created to provide liquidity to states experi-
encing financial distress and undergoing a restructuring if the state in question 
fulfils the requisite conditions for obtaining support. The EU Financial Stabil-
ity Fund would be financed by a transaction tax on all EU sovereign bond 
issuance, CDSs and other derivative transactions that reference EU sovereign 
bonds. The tax would be at a very low rate so as to not unduly limit the mar-
ket and to raise adequate revenue to assist states with temporary liquidity 
problems. 
